Book review

Language Misconceived

Janicki, Karol. 2006. Language Misconceived: Arguing for Applied Cognitive Sociolinguistics. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Reviewed by Tânia Gastão Saliés, University of the State of Rio de Janeiro.

Language Misconceived discusses misconceptions about language, encouraging a non-essentialist view of Applied Linguistics. In the author's words, the book's main objective is to help its readers 'realize how important linguistics is for handling everyday life' (Janicki, 2006: xi). Janicki fulfills his promise, mostly in Part II, where he shows data and conducts analyses that illustrate how non-essentialist reasoning could ameliorate everyday conflicts. Among the issues he brings to the fore are the use of standard varieties of language, legal and political matters, and quibbles in academia.

Janicki's book consists of three parts: Part I introduces the reader to essentialism, non-essentialism and Integrational and Cognitive Linguistics; Part II outlines the theory that lies behind Janicki's analyses; and Part III advances a set of instructions for those who would like to pursue a non-essentialist agenda.

Part I: From misconceptions to conceptions

In Chapter 2, Janicki argues for the inclusion of philosophy in linguistic discussions. He points out the link between philosophical assumptions and data analysis and addresses ontological commitments and their consequences - so-called communication disjunctions. After establishing a rationale for including philosophy in linguistics, the chapter juxtaposes the concepts of essentialism and nonessentialism, showing instantiations and consequences of each. Specifically, the chapter draws on sociolinguistic concepts (eg. communicative competence, diglossia, speech communities) to illustrate the problems that are associated with essentialist thinking. To solve the definition conundrums, the author suggests the establishment of working definitions. Janicki proposes that such definitions be based on thorough situated analyses of phenomena in their original context.

Chapter 3 is an outline of Roy Harris's (1981) theory of Integrational linguistics, discussing the conception of linguistic categories as continua (more verby, less nouny, etc.; cf. Taylor, 2003).

Chapter 4 explains and illustrates notions that are central to Cognitive Linguistics, such as fuzzy categories, categorization by prototype, and conceptual metaphor. Discussing definitions from Biology and Mathematics, Janicki questions the possibility of definitions in terms of necessary and sufficient definitions. He sides with philosophers such as Popper (1957) and Penrose et al. (1997), saying that the search for final answers wastes time and creativity, and that categorization is intertwined with human perception. Radial categories and unconventional metaphors are introduced as examples of flexibility and creativity. In addition, the chapter discusses misunderstandings in human communication. Janicki views misunderstandings as a problem of categorization.

Part II: Misconceptions in practice

Part II discusses the central claim of the book, which is that many communicative conflicts are rooted in essentialist positions. Janicki distinguishes between conceptual, entrenched, and psychological essentialism, moving on to explore conflicts in different professional contexts. To do so, he presents data from magazines such as Newsweek or Times, interrogation instruction handbooks, as well as debates in academia and education. The purpose is to advance 'solutions' that emerge from a Cognitive Linguistic perspective, in particular prototype theory.

Chapter 5 places absolute definitions at the heart of most conflicts and shows how they have the power to alter states of affairs. An illustration is the Clinton-Lewinsky affair, which altered the definition of a sexual relation. Janicki emphasizes that awareness of the openness of meaning can only be raised by a Cognitive Linguistic approach that recognizes categories with fuzzy boundaries and different degrees of membership. Further, it argues for two possible definitions: the real functioning definition (the one with which language users operate) and the working definition (eg. Kenneth Starr's for one, Clinton's for another). Janicki shows how neither party in this conflict can prove that their definition is absolutely correct. The winning party is the one that manages to impose parts of its definition on others.

Chapter 6 presents a set of misconceptions about defendants, instructions for interrogation and the ideological affiliation of judges, exploring their alignment with essentialism and how it may cause some guilty suspects to be free and some innocent suspects to go to jail. It closes by recommending that the legal profession open up for nonessentialist thinking, promoting open-mindedness, attention to linguistic and cultural variation, and general flexibility in making judicial decisions.

Chapter 7 addresses different views of science, taking the heated debate that followed Julia Kristeva's receiving the Holberg Memorial Prize for outstanding scholarly work in sciences and humanities as point of departure. Its objective is to put Kristeva's work within the context of philosophy of science and evaluate it in the light of a non-essentialist framework. Janicki advocates an open definition of science, similar to Popper's (1945): 'Science is a prototype, as such, no intellectual activities can in principle be barred from being referred to by the word science' (p.147, author's italics).

Chapter 8 illustrates how conflicts in the educational arena are largely about what is defined as correct (eg. standard English) or incorrect (eg. Ebonics). It tackles standard language varieties, language purism, and treatment of words. Then the chapter advances solutions and recommendations for teaching toward nonessentialism and encourages new coinages of words so that perception in terms of continua rather than bipolar extremes is promoted.

Part III: Applied cognitive sociolinguistics

Chapter 9 summarizes the main points of the essentialist vs. nonessentialist views, explains why the author embraces the latter, and advances a set of instructions geared toward approaching language in nonessentialist ways, among them 'do not assume meaning is in a word', 'avoid what-is questions', and 'establish working definitions'.

Evaluation

I believe that the book under review has several benefits: It forces the reader to acknowledge the circularity of definitions, and their relation to the classical model of categorization. The data presented in Part II illustrates how prototype theory could ameliorate the understanding of everyday conflicts, successfully meeting one of the book's objectives. Janicki approaches socio-political issues from the perspective of Applied Linguistics, mostly in chapter 5. The chapter clarifies how linguists can contribute to ongoing debates, outlining methodological steps and practices of data analysis.

The organization of the book could have been somewhat improved. Repeated discussions of certain topics (eg. chapter 4, the discussion on fuzziness and unconventional metaphors), digressions (eg. p.128-130; 159-60), and broad statements such as 'it is a very significant misconception' (preface, p.4) yield the impression of a certain circularity. Given the data presented in Part II, repetitions could have been minimized and overly general and axiological statements could have been avoided. A better topic flow, with repetitions kept to the summaries at the end of each chapter, would have made for much smoother reading.

Open to debate are some analyses of passages from Langacker (1983: 27), Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 40), and Lakoff (1990: 40) in chapter 4 (pp. 59-63). Although Janicki states that a clear distinction between essentialist and non-essentialist utterances is not possible, he appears to advance precisely such a dichotomy in those passages. For example, contrary to what Janicki states, the excerpt by Ungerer and Schmidt's does not say that legal language is precise or that some concepts are fuzzy while others are not. Actually, the passage discusses categories that can be made discrete by an expert definition, while an everyday prototype understanding of the category co-exists with this definition. Lakoff's case is introduced simply to say that it could be unjustly misunderstood as essentialist. If it is not, why bring it up? The repeated emphasis on essentialist positions might mislead less experienced readers.

The set of instructions in the last chapter concerned me for the same reason. It is one thing to outline essentialist and non-essentialist tenets and use them to analyze data critically, it is another to advance a set of instructions for linguists to pursue a non-essentialist agenda. Why not simply lay out critical issues for reflection? The purpose is to inspire, as the author himself says. The fact of the matter is that from reading Part I and Part III, I got the impression that the book was about why we should adopt non-essentialism. I would definitely prefer to see the data speak for itself, just like in the last paragraph where, instead of trying to help students go for a non-essentialist agenda, the author tries to inspire them to reflect critically about their theory of language.

References

Harris, R. 1981. The Language Myth. London: Duckworth.

Lakoff, G. 1990. The invariance hypothesis: Is abstract reason based in image-schemas? Cognitive Linguistics, 1/1, 39-74.

Langacker, R. 1987. Foundations of cognitive grammar. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Penrose, R, Shimony, A., Cartwright, N., Hawkings, S. 1997. The large, the small, and the human mind. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Popper, K. 1957. The poverty of historicism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Popper, K. 1945. The open society and its enemies. Vol 2. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Taylor, J. 2003. Linguistic categorization (3rd. ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ungerer, F., & Schmid, H.J. 1996. An introduction to cognitive linguistics. London: Longman.

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