Book review

Cognitive semantics and scientific knowledge

András Kertész. 2004. Cognitive semantics and scientific knowledge: Case studies in the cognitive science of science. John Benjamins: Amsterdam/Philadelphia

Reviewed by Zsuzsanna Schnell, University of Pécs, Hungary.*

In Cognitive Semantics and Scientific Knowledge, András Kertész investigates the potential explanatory force of cognitive semantics, asking whether the field can provide answers to important, long debated questions in the philosophy of science.

The application of cognitive semantics to the philosophy of science addresses the need to unify experimental strategies and empirical data with explanatory paradigms and linguistic theories. An integration seems all the more desirable since current linguistics heavily borrows methods, findings and empirical foundations from other disciplines in the cognitive sciences, such as computer science, biology, neurology, sociology, psychology, anthropology, and ethnology.

The book consists of 4 parts and 15 chapters. The main question investigated is whether cognitive semantics can solve problems in the philosophy of science, and if so, to what extent. In the introduction the author aims to define the prospects and limits of cognitive semantics. So as to deal with the issue effectively, Kertész narrows down the scope of the discussion to two clear-cut cognitive semantic theories: the two-level approach to cognitive semantics (the modular view) (cf. Bierwisch 1983), and Lakoff and Johnson's cognitive theory of metaphor (the holistic view) (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980). He also gives reasons why these two theories are chosen to illustrate the two different approaches.

Confronting the two above mentioned approaches, Kertész investigates their respective prospects and limits. After an overview of the state of the art in the philosophy of science, he puts forward a thesis of a metascientific extension of cognitive semantics (MECS). Kertész points out that one of the main tasks of the field is to contribute to the solution of problems investigated by the philosophy of science in general, and to the cognitive science of science in particular. Thus, the question is reformulated in the following way: what are the prospects and limits of cognitive semantics when applied to scientific knowledge?

Chapter 2 investigates the generalized modularity hypothesis, which underlies the two-level approach, and which assumes that human cognitive behavior is organized in a modular way. This view is confronted with the holistic view, which claims that human cognition is structured metaphorically. The metascientific extension of these hypotheses yields two contradicting claims: scientific knowledge is either organized in a modular fashion or metaphorically. Hence, the main question of the book is what are the prospects and limits of the metascientific extension of the main hypothesis of the modular, and that of the holistic view?

In part II of the book Kertész addresses a classic problem of the philosophy of science: the problem of theoretical terms. The power of the two approaches is tested by examining whether they can serve as explanatory paradigms for this problem. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the consequences of accepting one or the other theory. Chapter 6 articulates the conclusions, stating that cognitive semantics may offer novel and unexpected solutions to classic problems of the philosophy of science.

Part III focuses on another highly debated issue of the philosophy of science: the relationship between the 'conceptual' and the 'social' aspects of scientific knowledge. Chapter 7 describes the background of such investigations, indicating that the problem of social factors in scientific knowledge is ideal for testing the potential of any approach aiming to capture substantial aspects of scientific knowledge. Chapter 8 tests the prospects of the modular, chapter 9 those of the holistic approach. Kertész presents several thought experiments and concludes that the modular approach can, to a certain extent, provide a solution to the apparent antagonism between the social and the cognitive aspects of scientific knowledge.

A case study in chapter 9 reveals that scientific theories, their concepts, hypotheses and the structure of their theoretical terms are of metaphorical nature, and are, therefore, considered to be integral elements of human cognition. Thus, the cognitive theory of metaphor can be used as an approach to the cognitive science of science. It also widens the scope of linguistics to a considerable extent, since its concepts and theories transcend boundaries of linguistics, and it extends to problems of metascience as well.

Chapter 10 synthesizes the findings and formulates basic generalizations, delineating the prospects of the metascientific application of cognitive semantics. In sum, both investigated approaches are capable of solving different metascientific problems. Despite their conflicting premises, both approaches can be extended so as to capture analogous problems of the philosophy of science. They yield solutions differing not only from each other, but also from established perspectives in the analytic philosophy of science.

Throughout the book, Kertész delays discussing the limits of the two cognitive semantic approaches to a metascientific application, keeping the reader in suspense up until the last, fourth part of the book. Chapter 13 addresses metascientific reflection, concluding that the cognitive science of science and the practice of cognitive semantics are trivially compatible with each other. Metascientific reflection may contribute directly, but in a restricted manner to the tasks of cognitive semantics.

Chapter 14 summarizes the limits of the metascientific application of the two confronted approaches, concluding, that both views are capable of solving classic problems of the philosophy of science. However, as Kertész points out, their limits reside in the fact that their argumentation is burdened with the peculiarities of plausible inferences, in the emergence of fallacies and in the inherent shortcomings of the approaches themselves.

The last chapter recapitulates the main points of the argumentation, lending the book a reader-friendly structure. The chapter also addresses future implications of the findings, in which the author delineates the perspectives and potentials of cognitive semantics as a metascientific paradigm, suggesting, among others, to widen the scope of the philosophy of science by integrating cognitive semantic methods into the new field of the cognitive science of science.

Discussion

Cognitive semantics and scientific knowledge is a fruitful, enlightening book. The findings it yields provide promising starting points for future linguistic and metascientific research alike. The book is a valuable contribution to the new field of the cognitive science of science. However, some points merit critical discussion.

In confronting the two cognitive semantic theories (modular vs. holistic) from different aspects, Kertész does not explicitly define the nature and the extension of the modular approach. This might be a concern for objections: it would be helpful to clarify the book's generalized modularity hypothesis, and its relation to the Fodorian and Chomskyan approaches it stems from: to what extent is it similar to, and different from the classic theories of modularity; what is the generalized content of the two classic modular approaches?

In trying to determine to what extent cognitive linguistics can contribute to the understanding of scientific knowledge, we need to be aware that there are different types of knowledge. A native speaker's knowledge of a language (implicit) differs from that of someone learning it as a foreign language (explicit). Our knowledge of actions, such as e.g. driving a car, differs from that of our autobiographical data, which again differs from the knowledge of the words of a poem, or a song we have just learned, etc. These different types of knowledge correspond to different types of memories, and thus have different neurological representations. Distinguishing and clarifying the variety of knowledge types in the investigation of scientific knowledge may help to narrow down the issue and to find plausible answers to the questions raised.

A third question concerns the relation between the sub-disciplines of cognitive science and cognitive science itself. Is cognitive science a sum of its overlapping component fields? Or is there something more, something emergent or synergic, just like in understanding an idiom: an emergent structure in its own right (cf. Fauconnier and Turner 1998), which is more than the simple sum of its components? In other words, can we decompose cognitive science into its contributing disciplines, or should we look for a merger culminating in an emergent structure with a distinct explanatory paradigm and its own methods and strategies?

Kertész confronts the two theories under discussion on the grounds that cognitive linguistics is a sub-discipline of cognitive science; that is, based on the premise that the proposed cognitive science of science may borrow methods from its sub-disciplines in determining the extent of their explanatory force. This, however, may suggest a cognitive science which is simply the sum of its sub-disciplines; a view that may be debated (cf. Kuhn 1996).

The author himself points out the limits of the two cognitive semantic theories' explanatory force when applied to scientific knowledge. The reason for this may partly lie in that the cognitive science of science as a new explanatory paradigm put forward shall look for and propose a model of its own, rooted in mentalistic, introspective methodology in mapping and understanding scientific knowledge. It shall not content itself with borrowing methods from simply one, or from any of the sub-disciplines, such as cognitive semantics, but must evoke its own emergent structure of sub-disciplines, contributing in this new way with a new sense to the contemporary formulation of the cognitive science of science.

References

Bierwisch, M. (1983). Essays in the psychology of language. Berlin: Zentralinstitute für Sprachwissenschaft.

Fauconnier, G. and Turner, M. (1998). Conceptual integration networks. Cognitive Science 22:2.133-187.

Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Kuhn, T. (1962, 1970, 1996). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

* Note: Work on the present paper was supported by the Research Group for Theoretical Linguistics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences at the Universities of Debrecen, Szeged and Pécs.

© 2002-present ICLA; all rights reserved.
Site admin information and contact